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 KESAN STRUKTUR PEMILIKAN DAN MEKANISMA PENGAWASAN 
TERHADAP KUALITI PEROLEHAN DAN PENAKSIRAN PASARAN  
ABSTRAK 
Tesis ini didorong oleh peralihan ke arah kawalan berdasarkan pasaran atau kawalan  
kendiri bagi pasaran modal Malaysia. Di dalam persekitaran demikian, kualiti maklumat 
adalah penting. Dengan berlatar belakangkan struktur pemilikan syarikat yang dikatakan 
memburukkan konflik pengasingan pemilikan dan kawalan, dan yang berkemungkinan 
menghadkan maklumat kepada pihak awam, tesis ini mengkaji sama ada struktur 
pemilikan sedemikian membawa kepada kualiti perolehan yang rendah. Perolehan 
adalah maklumat yang penting kepada pasaran. Dan sekiranya pasaran benar-benar 
berkawalan kendiri, tesis ini mengkaji samaada pasaran menaksir kualiti perolehan dan 
elemen tadbir urus; struktur pemilikan dan mekanisma pengawasan (jawatankuasa audit 
dan pegangan pemegang saham utama). Pasaran menaksir elemen tersebut dengan 
menghendaki pulangan tertentu, iaitu kos ekuiti, di mana elemen tersebut ditanggap 
sebagai risiko maklumat. Kajian ini berdasarkan satu sampel syarikat tersenarai bagi 
tahun perakaunan berakhir 2004. Ukuran kualiti perolehan yang digunakan ialah kualiti 
akruan, akruan terpilih, keberterusan dan kebolehramalan. Kajian mendapati pegangan 
pemegang saham utama iaitu satu mekanisma pasaran, berkait secara signifikan dengan 
kualiti perolehan terpilih di mana ini bermakna yang pemegang saham utama adalah 
mekanisma pengawasan yang penting. Ini berbeza dengan keputusan berhubung 
mekanisma perundangan iaitu jawatankuasa audit. Tiada satu ciri jawatankuasa 
juruaudit (kebebasan dan kecekapan) berkait secara signifikan dengan mana-mana 
ukuran kualiti perolehan dan juga ciri tersebut tidak dinilai. Ini memberi implikasi 
penting terhadap perbelanjaan sumber secara relatif terhadap mekanisma perundangan 
dan mekanisma pasaran. Penemuan bahawa pegangan pemegang saham utama dinilai 
 xi
merupakan sumbangan penting kerana ianya memberi makna yang pegangan pemegang 
saham utama meningkatkan aliran maklumat empunya kepada pihak awam dan 
seterusnya mengurangkan risiko maklumat. Walau bagaimanapun kajian ini tidak 
mendapat bukti yang mengaitkan hak aliran tunai/ mengundi dan jenis pihak mengawal 
(keluarga, kerajaan, institusi, syarikat dan pengurusan) dengan kualiti perolehan dan kos 
ekuiti. Kajian ini menyumbang bukti baru di Malaysia yang menunjukkan kualiti 
perolehan mempengaruhi kos ekuiti. Keputusan berhubung kualiti akruan dan 
keberterusan adalah konsisten dengan kedua-dua ukuran kos ekuiti. Akruan terpilih 
adalah berkait secara signifikan dengan ukuran kos ekuiti. Implikasi penting ialah 
syarikat mungkin mencapai objektif tertentu dengan melakukan aktiviti yang 
menurunkan kualiti perolehan, tetapi syarikat terpaksa membayarnya dalam bentuk kos 
ekuiti yang tinggi.   
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EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND MONITORING 
MECHANISMS ON EARNINGS QUALITY AND MARKET ASSESSMENT 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is motivated by the move towards a market-based regulation or self-
regulation for the Malaysian capital market. In such environment the quality of 
information is important. Against a background of companies’ ownership structure that 
allegedly exacerbates the separation of ownership and control conflict, and that possibly 
limits transparency of information to the public, this thesis examines if such ownership 
structure leads to lower earnings quality. Earnings ia an important information to the 
market. And if indeed the market is self-regulating this thesis examines if the market is 
assessing earnings quality and the elements of governance; ownership structure and the 
monitoring mechanisms (audit committee and substantial shareholding). The market 
assesses these elements by requiring a certain return, the cost of equity, where 
accordingly these elements are perceived to be an information risk. This study is based 
on a sample of listed companies for the accounting year end 2004. The earnings quality 
measures used are accrual quality, discretionary accruals, persistence and predictability. 
It is found that substantial shareholding, a market mechanism, to be significantly 
associated with the discretionary earnings quality which suggests the substantial 
shareholders is an important monitoring mechanism. This is in contrast to the results of 
a rule based mechanism, audit committee. None of the characteristics of audit 
committee (independence and competence) is significantly associated with all measures 
of earnings quality and neither are they priced. This has an important implication on the 
relative spending of resources by regulators on market and rule based mechanisms. The 
finding that substantial shareholding is priced is a significant contribution as it suggests 
that substantial shareholding is a mechanism that increases proprietary information flow 
 xiii
to the public and hence reduces information risk. This study, however has not found any 
evidence that relates cash flow /voting rights and the type of controlling party (family, 
government, institution, company and management) with earnings quality and the cost 
of equity. This study contributes new evidence in Malaysia that earnings quality 
influences cost of equity. The results for accruals quality and predictability are 
consistent across the two measures of cost of equity. Discretionary accruals are 
significantly associated with one measure of cost of equity. An important implication is 
that companies may achieve their objectives by engaging in activities that lead to lower 
earnings quality, but they stand to pay a higher price in the form of higher cost of 
equity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation of research 
 
The Asian financial crisis has been claimed to be the wake-up call for corporate 
governance (CG) reform in the Asian region. In response to the crisis, the Malaysian 
regulators have taken a different approach to regulation by placing the responsibility of 
valuing the companies in the hands of market players. Under the market based valuation 
where the disclosure based regime operates, the regulator no longer assesses the merits 
and worth of corporate proposal namely in security offerings and issuance (Securities 
Commission 1999).  
 
This market-based approach calls for the need for high quality disclosures/ financial 
reporting and high standard of corporate governance (Securities Commission 1999, 
Securities Commission Annual Report 2002). The role of regulators is to set standards 
to meet this need. Figure 1.1 depicts this market based approach.  
 
Whilst certain structural elements of CG such as corporate ownership and control are 
the product of the socio-economic development and government policies, in this 
reformed environment with high quality of information market players are expected to 
be able to discern good governance in form and substance and make assessment 
accordingly. In the words of Emeritus Professor Mohamed Ariff, 
‘Good corporate governance is more than a check list of dos and don’ts. 
It is essentially an infrastructure of built-in checks and balances. Good 
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governance is not confined to the top layer of the corporate hierarchy, as 
governance and processes are intricately linked.’ (Emeritus Professor 
Mohamed Ariff at http://www.mier.org.my/mierscan/ -‘Banking on 
Corporate Governance’ 25 March 2005) 
 
 
 
Regulators 
set standards 
Corporate 
Governance 
mechanisms 
 
Companies 
High Quality 
Information Market 
Players’ 
Assessment 
Pricing 
Figure 1.1 Market-based regulatory environment 
 
The fact that market penalizes and rewards, or assesses companies for poor or good 
governance, the market consequences of governance, is part of this checks and balances. 
This research is motivated by this development into market based approach to 
regulation which is although new but has been evolving.  
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1.1.1 High standard of corporate governance (CG) and quality of information 
imperatives for effective market-based regulation 
 
Substantial effort to improve reporting and CG practices is evidenced from the many 
guidelines and rules for best practices established (for example Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) (2000)), and laws enacted (Financial Reporting Act 
1997, amendments to securities and companies law (2000)). A number of CG 
mechanisms has long been adopted such as the rules governing independent directors 
(1987) and audit committees (1993) (SC web page). These rules were subsequently 
enhanced by the revamping of Exchange Listing Requirements in 2001. This major 
revamp among others includes disclosure of the extent to which companies comply with 
the MCCG.  
 
Rules to protect investors and to promote transparency in ownership were also enhanced 
to include for example rules regarding market manipulation, false and misleading 
information, prohibition from hiding behind nominees (Securities Law) and one-share-
one-vote (s55 Companies act 1965). 
 
In the area of financial reporting, both securities law and companies act have 
incorporated requirements to comply with standards produced by Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board. Since August 1999, the exchange listing requirements provide for 
companies to report financial information (which include income and cash flow 
statements, balance sheet and explanatory notes) every quarter. The Bursa Malaysia 
regularly investigates variances between these unaudited reported results and the year 
end audited results. 
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 These requirements together supposedly ensure that those who are in control of 
companies act in the interest of all shareholders and that information that are made 
available to the market actually reflect the economic performance of the companies. The 
market players act accordingly through the pricing mechanism and thus ensure efficient 
resource allocation. In other words, market players use disclosed information to assess 
companies by requiring high return for high risk companies. Thus poor quality 
information distort this risk assessment and market players may make wrong investment 
decisions. 
 
1.1.2 Standard of corporate governance and quality of information in substance  
 
Mere compliance to disclosure requirements and corporate governance practices 
guidelines, that is compliance in form, does not necessarily ensure that those who are in 
control of corporate decisions do not in substance, subvert the intent and spirit of those 
rules and guidelines. There are still practices that are not covered by the rules and 
especially in financial reporting there is still room for managerial discretion. It has been 
reported that each of the companies in the United States that was involved in fraudulent 
scandals such as Enron, Tyco and Disney was in full compliance with the standards for 
corporate governance related to the board of directors (BOD) and audit committee set 
by the subsequently enacted Sarbanes Oxley Act (Pergola 2005). Most of them were 
audited by one of the Big 4 (or 5 then) auditors. 
 
Although not to the same scale as the scandals in the US market, the Malaysian market 
is not short of improper practices even with the strengthening of the regulations 
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described above and with increased surveillance. The SC Annual Report 2003 for 
example cited incidences of assets acquisitions and disposals at  questionable prices. It 
is also reported that companies create debts to offset contractual obligation. There are 
also questionable transactions detected by the SC such as the acquisition for cash of a 
private company that was subsequently disposed as a settlement of fictitious debt, the 
use of money-lending licenses for what was purportedly in the ‘ordinary course of 
business’, and the creation of a liability for a company that originated from private loan 
arrangement between individuals. The findings reported in the SC annual report 
emerged from targeted surveillance, where the SC focused on certain activities and 
reporting standards. How widespread such activities among the listed companies is an 
important empirical question. And of equal importance is the question of how pervasive 
the practices that are although legal, not in pursuance of shareholders wealth 
maximization.  
 
The incidences of improper and unethical practices possibly signal a failure of the 
various CG mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry and align interest of those in 
control with other shareholders. Some of the mechanisms are to enforce independence 
of BOD and audit committee. However independence in form does not necessarily 
ensure independence in substance. This is so as independent directors could be 
associated with the company or the chief executive officer in ways that are too subtle to 
be captured by the rules and regulations.  
 
Another possible reason which has not been given sufficient attention by researchers is 
the ability to expropriate funds at relatively less cost to the perpetrator as the disparity 
between cash flow rights (associated with ownership) and voting rights (associated with 
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control) of the perpetrator widens. This happens when concentration of control is 
achieved through shareholding of multiple layers of companies, thus the term pyramidal 
structure (this is explained in detail in Chapter 3).  
 
To have the controlling votes is important from the perspective of corporate 
governance. The owner has an influence over decisions such as dividend payments, 
appointment of key management personnel, etc. Thus Mr. Zee needs relatively small 
capital outlay to control PQR and could expropriate funds from the company as a 
controlling shareholder with relatively small cash consequences as owner.  
 
Samples of companies taken in past studies by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) and 
Fan and Wong (2002) indicate the existence of such control. Though s55 of Companies 
Act 1965 requires one share to have one vote to prevent such disparity, in substance in 
pyramidal structure such disparity exists.  
 
This form of ownership concentration is not so apparent by cursory study of substantial 
shareholders disclosure. Unlike in the US where companies are allowed to issue shares 
that carry more than one vote, such disparity is transparent. Thus the shareholders who 
hold the inferior shares with one vote each can discount the price of shares accordingly 
knowing the voting power of the other class of shares (Francis, Schipper & Vincent 
2005). However in Malaysia where it is not so transparent, therefore the non-controlling 
shareholders not-knowing the existence of such control would not be able to do so, 
hence the pricing mechanism for efficient resource allocation breaks down. 
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1.1.3 Substantial shareholders 
 
A mechanism that may reduce moral hazard faced by non-controlling shareholders is 
the existence of substantial shareholders i.e shareholders who own more than 5%. 
According to Kaplan and Minton (1994), Pound (1988) and Shleifer and Vishney 
(1986) a substantial shareholder has a role in controlling agency problems by actively 
monitoring the controlling party who in a widely held company, is the management. 
Similar role could be played by substantial shareholders in companies with concentrated 
ownership. 
 
In Malaysia it is common for companies to be held by a few substantial shareholders 
with shareholdings far higher than the threshold 5%, instead of just one substantial 
shareholder with the majority controlling rights, even though one may be with the 
highest shareholding and the apparent controlling party,. The following extracts from 
annual reports of ACP Industries Berhad and Glomac Berhad illustrate this type of 
ownership concentration.  
 
 
Table 1.1 ACP Industries Berhad- Analysis of Shareholdings as at 16 August 2004 
 
  
Direct Interest 
 
Indirect Interest 
 
Shareholders 
Number of 
Shares 
 
% 
Number of 
Shares 
 
% 
Metacorp Berhad 38,734,790 29.02   
MTD Capital Berhad   38,734,790 29.02 
Lambang Simfoni Sdn Bhd   38,734,790 29.02 
Employees Provident Fund Board 20,499,000 15.36   
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Metacorp Berhad, MTD Capital Berhad and Lambang Simfoni Sdn Bhd are companies 
under the control of Dato’ Dr Nik Hussain Abdul Rahman and his family members. It is 
fairly obvious that Dato’ Dr Nik Hussain and family are the controlling shareholder. 
However, the Employees Provident Fund Board with shareholding of around 15% could 
play a significant role in monitoring the controlling party actions.  
 
Table 1.2 Glomac Berhad- Analysis of Shareholdings as at 30 June 2004 
  
Direct Interest 
 
Indirect Interest 
 
Shareholders 
Number of 
Shares 
 
% 
Number of 
Shares 
 
% 
Dato’ Mohamed Mansor Fateh 
Din 
63,552,183 29.33   
Datuk Fong Loong Tuck 47,404,490 21.88   
Employees Provident Fund Board 14,456,590 6.67   
( Three other foreign companies with lesser shareholdings) 
 
Similarly for Glomac Berhad, the substantial shareholder Datuk Fong may be able to 
play a role in the checks and balance process assuming as apparent that Dato’ Mohamed 
Mansor and Datuk Fong are not related. 
 
In the West where aggressive takeovers bids are common, the existence of substantial 
shareholders may control manager’s behavior as they have the ability to remove non-
performing managers by facilitating takeovers. Thus the effectiveness of the other 
substantial shareholders hinges on whether such ability exists. According to Mak and Li 
(2001) in economies such as Malaysia, hostile takeovers are rare and conflicts are 
resolved through non-confrontational methods. Besides it would be easier to remove 
non-performing managers than the  other majority and controlling shareholders.  
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However the experience of KFC Holdings boardroom tussle in 2004/2005, where it was 
reported that the move to remove the board executive chairman was initiated by a 
substantial shareholder, indicated that perhaps the situation is changing (NST Business 
Times, 20 May 2005, pg 1). Thus the effectiveness of the substantial shareholders in 
monitoring the controlling party is an open question. The same arguments apply for 
institutional investors such as the  Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP). The 
fact that institutional investors played a major role in setting up the Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog, suggests that institutional investors on their own may not serve 
to be an effective monitoring mechanism. 
 
Another factor which makes the effectiveness of substantial shareholders as a control 
mechanism questionable in Malaysia is the potential alignment of interest between 
substantial shareholders and the manager or the controlling party  through kinship, 
social or economic relationship (Lim 1981) and  through political or governmental 
affiliation (Gomez & Jomo 1999, Gomez 2002). Thus a substantial shareholder in a 
company may share the same objectives as the controlling party resulting in a 
potentially cohesive control to the detriment of other shareholders. 
 
The role of substantial shareholders is an important and interesting area to consider as 
the monitoring and governance effect if any is inherently non-legal or not imposed by 
rules or standards unlike monitoring mechanisms such as audit committee and board of 
directors. Thus the results would shed light on the relative effectiveness of a rule based 
mechanism such as the audit committee and the board of directors and a market based 
mechanism, such as a significant shareholding of a shareholder other than the 
controlling shareholder.  In the Malaysian capital market. in the context of the market 
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based approach to regulation as described earlier, the relevant regulator has a significant 
role in setting standards and rules with regards to governance and quality of disclosure. 
This does not preclude the development of mechanisms through market forces such as 
the substantial shareholding. The substantial shareholder may play a role in aligning the 
interest of the controlling party and other shareholders including other non-controlling 
shareholders. 
 
It is a conjecture at this stage that improper practices by the controlling party which 
escape the law and other non-legal or market based mechanisms such as the substantial 
shareholders, potentially undermine the credibility of reported results namely the 
earnings figure. Even though financial accounting rules are extensive there is still room 
for the exercise of judgment and discretion. Thus activities related to the expropriation 
of non-controlling shareholders’ wealth, to management entrenchment and to 
manipulation of accounts without legitimate underlying economic activity could be 
hidden behind reported earnings numbers.  
 
1.1.4 Earnings as a useful measure 
 
It is expected that market players use a repertoire of measures and information from 
various sources. However earnings is a summary measure widely used (Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson & Schipper 2003, Liu, Nissim & Thomas 2002)). It reflects aggregate 
effects of accounting policy choice made. A survey by Price Waterhouse (2000) found 
that majority of chief executive officers believed price/earnings ratio was still relevant 
for market valuation. In addition, anecdotal evidence indicates that market players 
respond to earnings figure. It was reported that there were unusual share price 
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movements and dealings of Goh Bah Huat Berhad when it reported earnings of RM100 
million in its 31 December 2004 quarterly results, which  was later discovered to be 
erroneous and turned out to be a loss of RM21 million. Apparently some market players 
have acted on the erroneous profit. Thus for the proper functioning of the market, the 
state of earnings quality in Malaysia and whether they reflect undesirable elements 
described above are important empirical questions.  
 
1.1.5 A discerning market as enforcement agent 
 
In a market-based regulatory environment, market players play an important role in 
enforcement through the pricing mechanism and thus ensure efficient resource 
allocation. Investors must be able to reinforce proper conduct in companies by 
rewarding or punishing appropriately, in technical terms by requiring higher rate of 
return for high risk companies and vice versa. Certainly the rules and guidelines are 
substantial enough to ensure high quality information to be available to the market for 
investors to act accordingly. However for this approach to regulation to be effective, the 
market players must be able to evaluate beyond the disclosed information. 
 
For example in the case of Goh Ban Huat Bhd cited above, market responded to the 
huge earnings announced without discerning the error impounded in the figure. It is not 
that there has not been other indicators to doubt the figure such as past quarterly losses, 
but the market players did not interpret cautiously the earnings figure. On the other hand 
Mitton (2000) interpreted market reaction to the purchase of Renong shares by United 
Engineers Malaysia at an inflated price as a penalty for bailing out the troubled parent 
company. Market could see through the expropriation of other shareholders interest and 
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UEM share price dropped by 38% on the day the purchase was announced (NST 19 
Nov 1997, pg 62). 
 
Given the contradicting observations, it is therefore important to examine whether 
market players in the Malaysian capital market appropriately prices, if at all they do, 
earnings quality by requiring higher return from companies with lower earnings quality 
and vice versa. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
 
Theoretical analyses (Berle & Means 1932, Jensen & Meckling 1976) have established 
the moral hazard problems associated with information asymmetry when there is a 
separation between ownership and control. In particular, the controlling party has an 
incentive to expropriate company’s resources and to take actions that may be in 
divergent to the interest of the other party, who have no access to information in order 
to detect and monitor such practice. The separation of control and ownership is 
particularly aggravated when the controlling party can further enhance control through 
pyramid ownership structure, when there is concentration of ownership or with the 
existence of shareholders that could exercise control by virtue of these shareholders 
relationship with the controlling party.  
 
Since rules and regulations, and other non-legal monitoring mechanism cannot firewall 
completely improper practices as described in preceding paragraph, it is reasonable to 
expect the higher the degree of separation of ownership and control, the greater the 
likelihood of such improper practices. The improper practices are potentially manifested 
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in earnings which then result in low earnings quality. Unlike in a clinical and case by 
case study, in an empirical study such improper practices are not easily observable. 
Thus earnings quality is a proxy to the likelihood of improper practices.  
 
Given the considerable amount of effort and resources that have been spent on putting 
in place rules and standards for good corporate governance, it is not only important to 
examine if good governance characteristics are associated with high earnings quality 
and vice versa, it is also important to examine if the capital market is pricing correctly 
the companies based on the earnings quality. 
 
Thus the purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between the extent of 
separation of ownership and control in Malaysian listed companies, together with the 
rule based and market based mechanisms, and earnings quality. Further, drawing from a 
theoretical assertion that information risk is priced, this study will determine if the 
capital market rewards or penalizes companies for the companies’ quality of earnings 
through required return or cost of equity. In essence this is a departure from traditional 
theory that only systematic risk is priced. Any idiosyncratic such as information risk 
arises from each company unique circumstances or company specific and can therefore 
be diversified away. As in previous researches, this study characterizes earnings quality 
as information risk. Low earnings quality poses a risk as investors cannot rely on 
earnings information to make investments decision and accordingly affects cost of 
equity. 
 
The characteristics associated with the separation of ownership and control poses 
information risk as the controlling party is privy to more information. Drawing parallel 
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to the original work that characterizes information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors as information risk, it is here characterized that information 
asymmetry between the controlling party and other investors as information risk. Thus 
this study examines if capital market rewards or penalizes companies, assesses 
companies with characteristics associated with separation of ownership and control. The 
association between the monitoring mechanisms, audit committee and substantial 
shareholders, with market assessment is also examined to see if these monitoring 
mechanisms is priced and therefore perceived as effective in reducing the information 
risk. 
 
1.3 Research Questions  
 
Against such background, this study seeks answers to the following questions: 
a) What is the nature of the separation of control and ownership amongst 
Malaysian listed companies? 
b) What is the state of earnings quality amongst Malaysian companies? 
c) Does the separation of ownership and control, in the presence of CG 
mechanisms, and the alleged potential conflict between controlling and non-
controlling managers/shareholders manifest itself in earnings quality? 
d) Do investors price accordingly the information risk  poses by the quality of 
earnings?  
e) Does the separation of ownership, in the presence of CG mechanisms, affect 
market assessment, i.e. is priced? Does the market assessment in turn affect 
the separation of ownership and control? 
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1.4 Objectives of Research  
 
The main objectives of the study are: 
a) to determine the extent of separation of control and ownership by examining 
ownership structures of  Malaysian listed companies from simple structure 
inducing manager-shareholder conflict to a more complicated pyramidal 
structures that induces controlling- non-controlling shareholders conflict, 
b) to determine whether the degree of separation of control and ownership in 
the presence of CG mechanisms, has an influence over the quality of 
earnings, 
c) to examine whether investors penalize or reward accordingly companies for 
low or high quality earnings, through the required return measure or cost of 
equity measure, and 
d) to examine whether the degree of separation of control and ownership in the 
presence of CG mechanisms, affect the required return or cost of equity. 
 
1.5 Significance of Study  
 
This study, as described earlier, is motivated by the development in the Malaysian 
capital market towards market based regulation where self-regulation by market players 
is an expected feature together with the active involvement of regulators in terms of 
setting rules and standards. Thus this study is therefore timely and contributes 
significantly towards understanding of a self-regulation aspect of the market and that is 
the market assessment of earnings quality and of the various governance mechanisms. 
The contribution of this study is towards understanding of the market consequences of 
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earnings information and governance mechanisms which unlike the contribution from 
many previous researches that examine the determinants of earnings quality which 
include the governance mechanisms themselves. The following describes the 
contribution of study from different aspects. 
 
1.5.1 Practical contribution 
1.5.1.1.To the regulators 
 
Regulators’ investigation is ‘clinical’ and targeted at certain area. Since this is a study of 
market behavior, thus the  market wide effect of the conflict of interest between 
controlling and non-controlling parties on earnings quality, and the market assessment 
of it could be understood better. Market based study determines the significance of the 
relationship and extent of the problem. 
 
It is also important that regulators are informed that the public resources spent on rules 
and regulations are effective and that the market perceived them as such. Otherwise it is 
best left to market forces and more resources are spent to ensure the market forces are 
working well. 
 
1.5.1.2. To market players 
 
In the market-based approach as earlier mentioned, market players play a major role in 
the price discovery. But market players must use the information and must know how. 
The SC and BM have stressed on the need for investors education. This research 
increase awareness of the potential conflicts brought about by control achieved through 
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pyramidal structure, the way earning figures, in substance should be read and the 
potential mispricing if low quality earnings is not read as such. 
 
1.5.2 Methodological and theoretical contribution 
 
1.5.2.1 By including  the different corporate governance mechanisms and not just the 
ownership structure, this study examines the relative significance of the different 
corporate governance mechanisms. These different mechanisms  is viewed here as rule 
based or imposed by rules and regulations such as the audit committee and one that 
emerges from market forces or market based such as substantial shareholding. 
 
1.5.2.2. This study attempt to measure the information risks poses by the CG 
mechanisms and ownership structure themselves. Whilst previous research characterize 
information risks as the imprecision in the information as reflected by the quality of 
earnings, this study attempt to characterize information risk as the relative amount of 
information that is kept private and made public.  
 
The study contributes to the understanding of whether the capital market penalizes or 
rewards companies with certain ownership and earnings characteristics by requiring a 
higher or lower rate of return. The required return or cost of equity is an important input 
into financing and investment decisions.  
 
1.5.2.3. Previous studies on ownership structure and other variables are carried out 
mainly in well developed economies or at regional level. Findings that explain well 
developed economies may not necessarily be applicable in a less developed economies. 
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Studies at a regional level such as Asia may fail to capture unique characteristics of 
specific country that explain differences across companies in that country.  This study 
look at cross-company differences of ownership structure, corporate governance 
mechanisms, earnings quality and cost of equity in Malaysia given the unique 
characteristics of Malaysian business environment in which ownership is known to be 
concentrated and  where there is a suggestion that  there is a weak market for corporate 
control and the role of the other substantial shareholders is relatively less researched. 
 
1.5.2.4. A significant contribution of this research, in the context of the theory 
associating information risk and required return, is from the examination of the 
substantial shareholding. the associations between substantial shareholding and each of 
earnings quality and required return have never been examined. In this context the 
results contribute towards the theory by establishing the substantial share holding role in 
increasing the precision of information and the flow of information from the private to 
public domain. 
 
1.6 Thesis Outline  
 
The introduction in this chapter is followed by Chapter 2. Chapter 2 reviews literature to 
derive theoretical justifications for the relationships that are examined in the thesis and 
to establish the extent of empirical studies that have already been carried out. This 
chapter ends by laying out the theoretical and research framework , and the hypotheses 
thus developed. 
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Chapter 3 lays out the relationships under study and develops hypotheses by drawing 
from the literature on theoretical and empirical studies reviewed in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 4 describes in detail the sample and variables. Where relevant examples are 
given to illustrate how a particular variable is measured. The justification for a chosen 
measure from alternatives of measures is also given. Finally the equations representing 
the relationships examined are laid out. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the results and brief analysis of the descriptive, bivariate and 
multivariate analysis of each of the relationships examined. Each hypothesis presented 
is tested. Where appropriate comparisons are made with findings of previous researches.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the results, provides explanation and where relevant justifications 
for findings. The discussion draws Important similarities or differences in the findings 
from previous researches. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes, highlights significant contribution, provides implications of the 
findings and discusses limitations of the research.. This chapter ends with some 
direction for future research.  
Table 1.3 Summary of motivation of study which leads to problem statement, research questions and objectives 
 
MOTIVATION OF RESEARCH PROBLEM STATEMENT RESEARCH QUESTIONS RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
1. The move towards 
disclosure/market based regulatory 
environment – requires high quality 
of information and corporate 
governance – requires market to make 
assessment. 
1.1.1 There has been many rules, 
regulations etc to improve CG and 
quality of information,  
1.1.2 but in substance CG and 
information may not be reliable due to 
nature of ownership in Malaysia 
(pyramidal structure ,etc) that 
exacerbates the separation of 
ownership and control conflict. 
1.1.3 The substantial shareholder’s 
ambiguous role, another feature of 
ownership needs to be examined 
1.1.4. Market uses many information  
but earnings very useful thus a useful 
measure/ a proxy of information 
quality in the market based regulation 
1.1.5. In the market based 
environment, also important that 
market prices accordingly information 
specifically earnings and elements of 
governance. 
 
Theoretical analyses establish the 
relationship between ownership 
structure (separation of ownership and 
control) and improper practices even 
with rules, regulations, etc. 
 
Improper practices lead to poor 
earnings quality, thus need to examine 
whether ownership structure is 
associated with earnings quality, and 
whether market prices earnings 
quality.  
 
Ownership structure poses 
information risk in terms of the 
proportion of information in 
public/private domain. Thus research 
also examines if market prices 
ownership structure together with the 
monitoring mechanisms. 
 
a) What is the nature of the 
separation of control and 
ownership amongst Malaysian 
listed companies? 
b) What is the state of earnings 
quality amongst Malaysian 
companies? 
c) Does the separation of ownership 
and control, in the presence of 
CG mechanisms, and the alleged 
potential conflict between 
controlling and non-controlling 
managers/shareholders manifest 
itself in earnings quality? 
d) Do investors price accordingly 
the information risk  poses by the 
quality of earnings?  
e) Does the separation of 
ownership, in the presence of CG 
mechanisms, affect market 
assessment, i.e is priced? Does 
the market assessment in turn 
affect the separation of 
ownership and control? 
 
a) To determine the extent of 
separation of control and 
ownership by examining 
ownership structures of  
Malaysian listed companies from 
simple structure inducing 
manager-shareholder conflict to a 
more complicated pyramidal 
structures that induces 
controlling- non-controlling 
shareholders conflict, 
b) To determine whether the degree 
of separation of control and 
ownership in the presence of CG 
mechanisms, has an influence 
over the quality of earnings, 
c) To examine whether investors 
penalize or reward accordingly 
companies for low or high 
quality earnings, through the 
required return measure or cost 
of equity measure, and 
d) To examine whether the degree 
of separation of control and 
ownership in the presence of CG 
mechanisms, affect the required 
return or cost of equity. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews literature to derive theoretical justifications for the relationships 
that are examined in the thesis and to establish the extent of empirical studies that have 
already been carried out.  
 
Part 2.1 first reviews literature on the nature and measure of earnings quality and 
provides justification for the chosen measures in view of the relationships that are being 
examined.  
 
To link the ownership structure and the monitoring mechanisms that are examined to 
earnings quality, part 2.2 described the literature that constitutes the body of knowledge 
related to agency theory and the information asymmetry problems when there is a 
separation of ownership and control. Empirical research is also reviewed to justify the 
measures used in the separation of ownership and control construct. The measures are 
the cash flow/ voting rights  and the type of controlling party. This section also 
establishes the theoretical justification for using two measures, independence and 
competence, for the audit committee and the role of audit committee and substantial 
shareholders in information asymmetry related problems. 
 
Part 2.2 establishes the expectation of association between cash flow/ voting rights, the 
type of controlling party, audit committee characteristics and substantial shareholder 
with earnings quality. 
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 Part 2.3 reviews literature that establishes the theory related to the pricing of 
information risks. There are two dimensions of information risks. One is with regards to 
the imprecision of information which provides a link between earnings quality and 
required return by the market. The other is with regards to the relative amount of 
information being made public or kept private by companies. This establishes the 
expectation between ownership structure and the monitoring mechanisms being 
examined with the required return. This section also reviews the empirical researches 
that explore those theoretical links, and discusses briefly the endogeneity problem in 
studies involving ownership structure. 
 
2.1 Earnings quality  
 
In previous research, such as in Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper 2004, earnings 
quality is associated with characteristics or attributes of earnings figure that are regarded 
as favorable and desirable or otherwise. It encompasses more than earnings 
management whether in good faith, such as in situation where well informed manager 
manages earnings to signal to users, or in bad faith where manager manages earnings to 
mislead users.  
 
There is a number of attributes for which this concept of earnings quality is assessed. 
Each attribute incorporates the respective perspective of the role of earnings in users’ 
decision making framework. Thus there is no single agreed upon measure of earnings 
quality (Schipper & Vincent 2004). Francis et al 2004, based on past research, 
categorized these attributes as accounting based and market based. The accounting 
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based attributes capture the uncertainty of future cash flows or earnings, whilst the 
market based attributes capture the market that is investors’ perception of such 
uncertainty.  The following described  these attributes. 
 
2.1.1. Accounting based earnings attributes  
 
Accrual quality  
This attribute measures how close is earnings to cash flow. The underlying view is that 
high quality earnings is one that is close to cash flow or low in accruals in general.  
Unlike cash flow, the incidence and magnitude of accruals is subjected to management 
discretionary  accounting choice, therefore could be subjected to management 
opportunistic action to mislead users, and is also influenced by a company’s individual 
and industry characteristics.  
 
In line with this view, two approaches in measuring accruals that lead to low quality 
earnings could be identified from past researches. In the first approach, researches 
identify the discretionary component of total accruals such as in Jones (1991) and 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) studies, or they identify the discretionary 
component of specific accruals such as bad debts in McNichols and Wilson (1988) In 
both cases the residuals from the regression of total or specific accruals on variables 
explaining the non-discretionary components of the respective accruals, are measures of 
discretionary accruals. This measure of discretionary accruals is taken as measure of 
earnings management that causes low quality earnings. 
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The second approach, taken in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al (2004), 
focus on the direct relationship between accruals and earnings  without regards to the 
discretionary/ manipulative and non-discretionary/ unintentional components, as 
measure of earnings quality. This approach views the role of accruals as to ‘adjust the 
recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted numbers (earnings) better 
measure firm performance’ (Dechow & Dichev 2002). Thus the measure of earnings or 
accrual quality is the residual from the regression of changes in working capital on last 
period, current period and next period cash flows from operations. 
 
Persistence 
A desirable attribute of earnings is if it is permanent or recurring. Earnings is of high 
quality if it is sustainable or in the term used in past research, persistent. This could be 
interpreted as a source of earnings from a company’s core operations. Earnings that is 
low in persistence could be interpreted as of low quality in the sense that a significant 
part of a company’s earnings is generated from sources that is temporary or ‘managed’ 
and therefore not recurring.  
 
Formally in econometrics term persistence is a measure of how current period earnings 
shock (unexpected changes) is carried forward or persist in the future. Thus past studies 
employ time series economics forecasting methods with varying assumptions regarding 
the earnings process. For example Francis et al (2003) as in previous studies (Lev 1983, 
Ali & Zarowin 1992) employ autoregressive model of order 1 (AR1) to estimate 
persistence (slope coefficient estimate). This assumes that current period earnings 
depend on previous period earnings plus an error term. Other studies as described in 
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